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Abstract
This paper analyzes a simple mobility-based model of mortgage lending and uses the re-
sults to illuminate the issue of mortgage points. The model predicts the points/interest-
rate trade-ofF observed in the market, and it also predicts that mobile borrowers choose
low-points/high-rate contracts from the available menu, in conformance with conventional
wisdom. These outcomes are shown to be a result of adverse selection, which arises because
of the lender's inability to distinguish the mobility characteristics of borrowers. Empirical
evidence is also presented showing the presence of a points/interest-rate trade-off in the
market. In addition, relying on a proxy variable, the results establish that borrowers choose
contracts from this menu according to mobility. The individual utility function is also es-
timated, which allows the marginal rate of substitution between points and the mortgage
interest rate to be computed for different types of borrowers.

Borrow^er Mobility, Adverse Selection, and Mortgage Points
by
Jan K. Brueckner*
1. Introduction
It is now widely recognized that when a borrower chooses from among the menu of
contracts available in the mortgage market, mobility plays an important role in the decision.
This effect is perhaps clearest in the choice between fixed and adjustable-rate mortgages.
A highly mobile borrower can exploit the lower initial rate on an ARM loan to enjoy lower
payments over the short expected holding period of his mortgage. Mobile borrowers should
therefore prefer ARMs over fixed-rate mortgages, a tendency that is confirmed empirically
by Dhillon, Shilling and Simians (1987) and Brueckner and FoUain (1988).^
Another decision where the role of mobility is generally acknowledged is the choice of
mortgage points. Points consist of an up-front fee, expressed as a percentage of the mortgage
amount, paid to lender at the time of loan origination. Typically, borrowers are offered a
menu of contracts embodying a trade-off between points and the loan interest rate: a high-
points loan carries a low interest rate, and vice versa. In making choices from this menu,
mobile borrowers place relatively little weight on any interest-rate premium because of their
short expected holding period, and are thus drawn to a low-points mortgage. Sedentary
borrowers, for whom the loan rate is more important, prefer to pay high points to secure a
low rate.
While this description of borrower behavior is widely accepted (see Dunn and Spatt
(1988), for example), there have been few attempts to explain why the menu of points/
interest-rate choices emerges in the first place. One explanation is provided by Chari and
Jagannathan (1989), who develop a model based on income uncertainty.'^ In their framework,
the potential mover has a riskier income stream than a sedentary borrower, and a move only
occurs when his future income realization is favorable. The optimal mortgage contract
provides insurance to the potential mover, which comes in the form of a lower rate (enjoyed
in the unfavorable state, where a move does not occur) together with mortgage points, which
are forfeited when income is high and the borrower moves. The insurance offered through
the mortgage contract is reduced, relative to the full-information case, when the lender
cannot distinguish between borrower types. Although this model offers numerous insights,
its predictions axe exactly the reverse of the those sketched above: the mobile borrower
chooses a loan with high points and a low rate, contrary to the conventional wisdom.
The present paper develops a different mobility-based model of mortgage lending that
may advance our understanding of mortgage points. The model portrays the borrower as
choosing a two-period mortgage with fixed payments that may differ across time. There is
no income uncertainty, but there is a chajice the borrower moves midway through the term
of his mortgage, in which case the second payment is not made. The model has two borrower
types differentiated by their probabilities of moving, and the analysis explores the nature
of the mortgage market equilibrium when these types are indistinguishable to the lender.
It is shown that the equilibrium menu of contracts exhibits a trade-off between initial and
final payments. The contract with low initial and high final payments is chosen by the
high-mobility borrower, while the low-mobility borrower opts for a contract with the reverse
features. As in Chari and Jagannathan (1989), the equilibrium involves adverse selection in
the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In particular, the lender's inability to distinguish
between borrower types distorts the available contract choices, lowering welfare relative to
the full-information case.
To see the mortgage-points interpretation of the model, let the initial mortgage payment
equal interest plus mortgage points, with the final payment representing interest alone. The
trade-off between final and initial payments then implies a trade-off between points and the
mortgage interest rate like the one observed in the market. In addition, selection of contracts
by borrower types conforms to conventional wisdom: the high-mobility borrower's choice
of the low-initial-payment/high-final-payment contract corresponds to a low-points/high-
rate choice, a vice versa for the low mobility borrower. Thus, the analysis shows that a
simple mobility-based model is capable of generating equilibria that closely resemble the one
envisioned in the conventional view of mortgage points. Moreover, the genesis of mortgage
points is shown to be a response to asymmetric information: points axe a device by which
lenders induce borrowers to self- select across mortgage contracts according to unobserved
mobility.
The analysis sketched above is presented in Section 2 of the paper. Section 2 also
discusses the effect of introducing a prepayment penalty into the model. Many authors
argue that mortgage points are a substitute for the prepayment penalty, and the analysis
is directed toward evaluating this claim. Section 3 offers empirical evidence relevant to the
model using a database compiled by the National Association of Realtors (the data gives
information on individual loan transactions). The empirical analysis begins by demonstrating
that a points/interest-rate trade-off is indeed present in the data. Then, using a proxy for
borrower mobility, it is shown that mobile borrowers do in fact choose mortgage contracts
with low points, confirming the predictions of the model as well as conventional wisdom.
Finally, an attempt is made to test for the presence of adverse selection.
2. Analysis
a. The model. All borrowers in the model purchase identical, fixed-size houses. For
simplicity, the mortgage used to finance each purchase is assumed to be a 100 percent loan,
with the size of the loan (value of the standard house) normalized to unity. Mortgages have a
term of two periods, and they require fixed payments that may differ across time."^ Payments
in the two periods (denoted zero and one) are equal to io and zi. Note that since the house
size is fixed, housing consumption can be suppressed as an argument of the borrower's utility
function, introduced below. Note also that the assiunption of a two-period mortgage term
is made only for simplicity; use of a longer, more realistic term would have no effect on the
analysis.
The borrower may move at the end of period zero after having made one mortgage pay-
ment, an event that occurs exogenously with probabiUty p. Different values of p distinguish
the two borrower types in the model: high-mobility borrowers have p = ph and low-mobility
borrowers have p = pi^ where pi < ph- Both types of borrowers have constant income per
period equal to y. In addition, both have the same concave Von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity function V{-) as well as the same discount factor 8. Under these assumptions, expected
utility for a type-7n borrower, m = hj, can be written
{l-p^)[V{y-i,) + 6V{y-h)-^8^Tm] + Pm[Viy-io) + S<ifm]- (1)
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The first bracketed term in (1) is discounted utility when no move occurs, an event that ha^
probabihty (1 — /9m) for m = /i, /. Tm in this expression equals type-m expected utility as of
period two given that a move did not occur in period one. Similarly, the second bracketed
expression is discounted utility given that a move did occur ('Pm equals expected utility as
of period one in this case). The quantities Tm and ^rn, which reflect the outcome of future
decisions, are assimied to be independent of z'o and ii,'*
Observe that (1) does not include a downpayment on the house purchase or a return
of housing equity upon sale, a consequence of the assumption of 100 percent financing.^
In addition, it should be noted that the present formulation rules out financially-motivated
mortgage prepayment, i.e., refinancing. Incorporating such prepayment would complicate
the model, obscuring the main points of interest.^
Indifference curves in io — ii space differ between high-mobility and low-mobility bor-
rowers, and this difference is central to the analysis. Differentiating (1), the marginal rates
of substitution between ii and io for the type-h and type-/ borrowers are equal to
S{1- ph)V'{y -ii) o{l- pi)V'{y -ii)
where the inequality follows because ph > pi- The indifference curves of the type-h borrower
are therefore steeper than those of the type-/ borrower in io — ii space. Differentiating (2), it
is easily seen that the indifference curves are concave (also, utility increases moving toward
the origin).
Lenders rely on short-term borrowing to generate loanable mortgage funds. The cost per
dollar of funds in period zero is denoted tq
,
and the expected cost in period one is denoted
ri . It is important to note that tq includes both the interest cost of short-term funds and the
administrative costs of mortgage origination, which are incurred in period zero. Therefore,
To > ri is likely to hold even in the case where the lender's borrowing costs are expected to
rise over time.
The lender is assumed to be risk neutral and to discount future profit by the factor 6.
Expected profit per dollar of loan to a type-m borrower is then'^
{I - pm)[io - ro -{- 0{ii - ri)] -\- Pm{io - ro), m-h,l. (3)
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The term in brackets is discounted profit when the borrower does not move, and io — tq is
discounted profit when a move occurs (in the latter case, no mortgage income is earned in
period one). Setting (3) equal to zero and rearranging yields the zero-profit locus for type-77i
lending:
The loci described in (4), which give combinations of zq and z'l where type-m lending yields
zero expected profit, are downward-sloping straight lines. The type-h locus is steeper than
the type-/ locus given ph > pu ^^^ the loci intersect at the point (^0,^1) = (j^o^^i), as shown
in Figure 1.®
Referring to Figure 1, it is evident that the zero-profit i\ value for the /i-types can be
higher or lower than the value for the /-types, depending on whether zq is below or above
To . Intuitively, if zq < tq , then zero profit requires that the lender earn a positive profit on
period-one lending (i.e., i\ > ri). The excess of z'l above ri, however, must be greater for
the /i-types since the profit has a lower probabihty of being realized. The type-h locus must
therefore lie above the type-/ locus to the left of the intersection. A parallel argument shows
the loci must have the reverse relationship to the right of the intersection.
b. Equilibrium. The first step in the analysis of equilibriiun is to establish the
relationship between the indifference curves and the zero-profit loci. Suppose that a type-
h indifference curve is tangent to the type-h zero-profit locus above the intersection point
of the two loci (denoted Q), as shown in Figure 1. Then the tangency point between a
type-/ indifference curve and the type-/ locus must also lie above Q, as shown. Generally,
the tangency points between indifference curves and the respective zero-profit loci for the two
types lie on the same side of Q. To establish this fact, observe that the type-m tangency
point will be above (below) Q when the indifference curve is steeper (less steep) than the
locus at Q, or as
^'^'"'^^
> «) ^77^ rn = h,l (5)6{l-p^)V'{y-ri) ^ ^ 9(1
-pm)
(the slope expressions come from (2) and (4)). However, since the (1 — pm) term cancels on
both sides of this inequahty, it follows that if the inequality holds for one borrower type, it
holds for both, establishing the above claim.
From (5), the location of both tangency points relative to Q depends on the relation
between V'{y — ro)/SV'{y — ri) and 1/9. Suppose that tq = ri, so that the cost of funds is
the same in both periods (implying higher pure borrowing costs in period one), and 6 = 6^
so that the borrower and lender discount the future identically. Then the two expressions
above are equal, and each indifference curve is tangent to its respective zero-profit locus at
Q. However, if S falls relative to 0, or if ri declines relative to tq, then the slope of each
indifference curve at Q rises relative to the slope of its respective locus (recall that V is
concave). The tangencies then move uphill, away from Q. Conversely, when S or ri rises,
the tangencies move away from Q in the downhill direction. Thus, tangencies above Q result
from a relatively low valuation of the future by the borrower or a low future cost of funds,
with the reverse cases yielding tangencies below Q.
Another fact concerns the location of the tangency points relative to one another. It
can be shown that a tangency point on the lower zero-profit locus must lie to the southwest
of a tangency on the upper locus. Thus, point B in Figure 1 must lie to the southwest of
point A, as shown, and the same relationship must hold when the tangencies are located
below Q.^
With this background, the analysis of equilibriima can proceed, using the approach of
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Consider first the full-information case, where the lender
can identify borrowers by type. In this case, the lender can earmark a particular mort-
gage contract for a given type of borrower, preventing the other type from choosing it. A
full-information equilibrium consists of a set of mortgage contracts and an assignment of
borrowers to contracts such that
(i) lenders earn zero profit
(ii) no contract outside the set attracts borrowers while earning nonnegative profit.
Under full information, the equilibrium contracts correspond to the tangency points on
the zero-profit loci for the two types of borrowers. Thus, contracts A and B, assigned to
type-h and type-/ borrowers respectively, constitute the full-information equilibrium in the
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situation shown in Figure 1. In the cilternate case, equihbrium contracts lie at tangencies
below g.io
In the full-information equilibrium shown in Figure 1, the type-h borrower prefers
the contract assigned to the type-/ borrower (contract B) to his own assignment (contract
A). Earmarking prevents the type-h individual from selecting this preferred option. When
the lender cannot distinguish between borrower types, however, earmarking is not possible
and borrower separation across contracts must be voluntary. Equilibria must then satisfy
incentive-compatibility constraints, which state that each borrower type weakly prefers the
i
contract designed for his type to the one designed for the other type (note that "assigning"
contracts to types is no longer feasible since the types are not observable).
To satisfy the relevant incentive-compatibility constraint, the type-/ contract must be i
moved to a position on the zero-profit locus where it is no longer strictly preferred by the
type-/i borrower. Such a position is shown in Figure 2 a^ contract F. Contracts downhill
from F also satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraint, but they leave profit opportunities
for lenders. ^^ Equilibrium contracts are therefore F and A.^^
In the alternate case where the full-information contracts lie below Q (see Figure 2), the
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type-/ borrower prefers the type-h contract (G) to the one assigned to him (K). To satisfy
the relevant incentive-compatibility constraint, the type-h contract must be relocated to the
position shown a^ J. Equilibrium contracts in this case are thus J and K.
Several features of these equilibria are noteworthy. First, observe that regardless of
which case applies, the equilibrium set of contracts exhibits a trade-off between initial and
final payments. Comparison of the contracts {A vs. F, and J vs. K) shows that one has a
high iQ and a low ii while the other has the reverse features. Moreover, in both cases, the
high-mobility borrower chooses the low- zq/high- zi contract, while the low-mobility borrower
chooses the contract with the reverse features.
The second noteworthy aspect of the equilibria is that asymmetric information lowers
the welfare of one borrower type relative to the full-information case. When the tangencies
are above Q, the type-/ borrower is hurt by the lender's inability to distinguish the types (he
gets contract F instead of B). Conversely, when the tangencies are below Q, asymmetric
information harms the type-h borrower. These two possibilities provide an apparent contrast
to the usual outcome with adverse selection, where harm is done only to a particular class
of agent (for example, the "low risk" insurance buyer is hurt in the model of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976)). However, this contrast disappears upon closer inspection when it is
realized that a borrower's "riskiness" is endogenous in the present model, and depends on
the magnitude of io. In particular, when zq > tq holds, so that zi < ri and period-one
profit is negative, the "high-risk" borrower is the type-/ individual, whose low p forces the
lender to absorb the period-one loss with high probability. Thus, as in Rothschild and
Stiglitz, the low-risk individual (the type-h borrower) is the one harmed by adverse selection
when the equilibrium lies below Q. Similarly, because of their high move probability, and
the corresponding low chance of earning a period-one profit, the type-h individuals are the
high-risk group in the case where io < vq. Thus, adverse selection again harms the low-risk
individual (the type-/ borrower) when the equilibriiun lies above Q.^^
c. Mortgage points. As explained in the introduction, the model has a mortgage-
points interpretation. To see this, let the period-one payment represent the mortgage interest
rate, and let the period-zero payment equal the interest rate plus mortgage points. In other
words, ii = t and io = t -\- p, where t is the interest rate and p is points (recall that z'o and ii
are payments per dollar of loan, and that the mortgage size is normalized to one). Then, for
points to emerge in equilibrium, it must be the case that the equilibrium contracts satisfy
io > ii, lying below the 45 degree line in Figure 2 (otherwise, p < 0).
Supposing for the moment that the equilibrium satisfies this requirement, it has a num-
ber of realistic features. First, the trade-off between io and ii noted above generates a
trade-off between mortgage points and the interest rate like the one observed in the market.
Referring to contracts J and K, the inequalities z'/ > z'l^ and z^ < z'q^ imply t-^ > t^ and
fJ _^pJ ^ ^K _^pK Subtracting the latter inequalities yields p-^ < p^, so that contract J has
low points and a high interest rate relative to contract K. Moreover, borrowers choose from
the points/interest-rate menu according to conventional wisdom: the high-mobility borrower
chooses J, the low-points/high-rate contract, while the low-mobility borrower chooses the
K, the high-points/low-rate contract. Similar observations apply when the equilibrium lies
above Q.
A problem with this points interpretation is that nothing in the model guarantees that
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the equilibrium contracts lie below the 45 degree line. Indeed, instead of voluntarily selecting
mortgages with front-loaded payments, as required under the points interpretation, impatient
borrowers axe likely to prefer contracts where payments rise over time (satisfying z'o < ii).
This outcome, however, violates a constraint imposed on real-world contracts that so far has
been omitted from the model. The constraint rules out mortgages with ascending payment
streams, which may lead to negative amortization and thus expose the lender to default risk.
These observations suggest that a more realistic model might impose the constraint
z'o > ii while assuming that borrowers prefer an ascending payment pattern. Full-information
contracts would then consist of corner solutions with io = ii, located where the 45 degree
line crosses the respective zero-profit loci. The nature of equilibria under such a modification
depends on the location of Q relative to the 45 degree line, which in turn depends on the
relative magnitudes of its coordinates, tq and ri. Figure 3 shows the case where Q lies
below the line, which requires tq > ri. This case is most plausible given that tq includes the
administrative costs of mortgage origination, while ri represents pure borrowing costs (see
above).
Contracts W and U in Figure 3 constitute the full-information contracts, which are
comer solutions involving zero points {io = ii). Equilibrium contracts under asymmetric
information are W and X , chosen by the type-h and type-/ borrowers respectively. The key
feature of this equilibrium is that while both borrower types prefer zero-points contracts,
asymmetric information prevents the type-/ borrower from satisfying this preference. Sep-
aration of the borrower types can only be achieved by offering the /-type an inferior choice
(contract X) that involves payment of positive points. It should be noted that this outcome
depends critically on the assumption that tq > ri, so that Q lies below the 45 degree line.
If Q instead lies above the line, borrowers' choices do not follow conventional wisdom, with
the positive-points contract chosen by the type-/i instead of the type-/ borrower.^'* Thus,
the presence of administrative costs, which makes ro > ri a plausible assumption, is critical
in generating an equilibrium with the expected features.
This discussion shows that when the constraint zq > ?i is imposed and Q is realistically
below the 45 degree fine, all equihbria conform to the points interpretation. In the case where
the constraint is binding, and in the alternative case where it is not, the equilibrium contains
a menu of contracts that exhibits a trade-ofF between io and zi , implying a trade-ofF between
points and interest rate, and borrowers select from the menu according to conventional
wisdom. Since all equilibria have this property, the model thus explains the emergence of
mortgage points. The analysis suggests that points serve as a device by which lenders induce
borrowers to self-select across mortgage contracts according to unobserved mobility. The
resulting need to satisfy an incentive-compatibiUty constraint, which forces both equilibrium
contracts to lie on a single indifference curve for one borrower type, generates a trade-ofF
between points and the mortgage interest rate.
While the model is built on the assumption of asymmetric information, it is interesting
to note that identical results would emerge if earmarking of mortgage contracts were legally
prohibited. To see this, suppose that information were perfect, with lenders able to identify
type-/i and type-/ borrowers, but that legal restrictions were to prevent lenders from assigning
borrowers to contracts on the basis of personal characteristics. Then, despite the presence
of full information, equilibrium contracts would have to satisfy an incentive compatibility
constraint, with the attendant distortions of choice. The points/interest-rate trade-off, then,
can arise either from asymmetric information or from legal prohibitions on earmarking.
d. The effect of a prepayment penalty. Prepayment penalties, which force the
borrower to pay a fee to the lender if the mortgage is paid off prematurely, are now infre-
quently used in the U.S. However, many commentators view points and prepayment penalties
as perfect substitutes, noting that points (like the prepayment penalty) represent a sizable
sum that is forfeited when the mortgage is prepaid (see Chari and Jagannathan (1989) and
Kau and Keenan (1987), for example). Given this view, it is interesting to investigate the
effect of a prepayment penalty in the present model. ^^ The ensuing analysis shows that,
in the presence of adverse selection, the prepayment penalty is not a perfect substitute for
mortgage points. Introduction of such a penalty can either raise or lower welfare, depending
on the nature of the equilibrium.
Let s denote the prepayment penalty per dollar of loan, which is paid in the event
that the loan is terminated after period zero. With this modification, the last term in the
expected utility expression (1) is replaced by Pm[y{y— io — •s)-|-^^m], and the last term in the
profit expression (3) is replaced by Pmiio — ^o + s). Introduction of the penalty corresponds
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to an exogenous increase in 5, starting from a situation where 5 = 0. As will be seen, the
effect of this perturbation depends on whether the equilibrium contracts lie above or below
Q. The analysis focuses on an equilibrium where the constraint zq > zi is not binding, and
the below-Q case is treated first (for concreteness, the equilibrium contracts are labeled J
and K, as in Figure 2).
The low-mobility borrower, who chooses contract K, satisfies the tangency condition
when 5 = 0, and he will continue to do so after a marginal increase in 5. Therefore, the
impact on his choices can be found by totally differentiating the following equations with
respect to 5, evaluating at 5 = 0:
{l-p,)V'{y-^K)^p^V'^y.^K_,^
^ 1
S{l-pi)V'(y-if^) 0(1
-pi) ^ ^
:K _ ^ , rp - i^ - PIS
6^(1
-pi)
Eq. (6) is the tangency condition, and its left-hand side equals the new MRS (reflecting
the modification of (1)) evaluated at K. Eq. (7) is the modified zero-profit condition.
Differentiating (6) and (7) yields, after some manipulation,
_^ . and ^ = -PI. (8)
From (8), introduction of the prepayment penalty has no effect on z'l for the type-/ borrower
while lowering Iq. Under the points interpretation, introduction of the penalty thus leaves
the interest-rate (z'l ) unchanged while lowering points by an amount /?/, equal to the expected
penalty. Moreover, as shown in the appendix, the penalty ha^ no effect on the welfare of the
type-/ borrower. Thus, when the borrower is initially at a tangency, the prepayment penalty
is indeed a perfect substitute for mortgage points .
In the full-information case, contract G would be selected by the type-/i borrower, and
the above conclusions (which apply to any tangency solution) would hold. Both borrowers
would then be unaffected by introduction of the prepayment penalty. With adverse selection,
however, the type-h borrower chooses contract J, and the impact of an increase in s is
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evaluated by differentiating another set of equations. The first is a zero-profit condition
analogous to (7). The second is a condition requiring the expected utihty of the type-
h contract, evaluated from the type-/ borrower's point of view, to remain constant as s
increases. This condition forces the type-h contract to remain on a fixed type-/ indifference
curve as s rises, as required in an adverse-selection equilibrium (the indifference curve is fixed
because type-/ utility is unaffected as s rises). As shown in the appendix, differentiation of
these conditions yields
ds
> (9)
as well as
'4 > «) and ^ < 0. (10)
Introduction of the prepayment penalty thus has an ambiguous effect on zq for the type-h
borrower, while raising t = i{ and lowering p = i^ — i( . Since the decline in points is
accompanied by an increase in the interest rate, points and the prepayment penalty are
not perfect substitutes from the perspective of the type-/i borrower. This nonequivalence
generates a welfare impact, which the appendix shows to be negative: expected utility falls
for the type-/i borrower as the penalty is introduced.
To gain some insight into this result, compare the case where the tangencies are above
Q and the type-/ borrower is the one hurt by adverse selection. The appendix shows that
in this case, introduction of the prepayment penalty has no effect on the type-/i borrower
while raising the welfare of the type-/ borrower. The penalty thus affects the borrower who
is harmed by adverse selection, but the direction of the impact hinges on the borrower's
identity. When the affected borrower is of type /i, a loss occurs; when the borrower is of
type /, a welfare gain emerges. These results arise because the prepayment penalty imposes
a disproportionate burden on the high-mobility borrower, who is more hkely to pay it. If
type-/i welfare is already compromised by adverse selection, addition of this extra burden
lowers it further. While the burden's (first-order) impact vanishes when the type-/i borrower
is at a tangency point, the change nevertheless improves the lot of the type-/ borrower, who
finds that the burden of adverse selection lessens.
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3. Empirical evidence
The purpose of the empirical work is to test three hypotheses that emerge from the
preceding analysis. The first hypothesis is that the menu of available mortgage contracts
exhibits a points/interest-rate trade-off. Since this hypothesis is obviously true on the basis
of casual empiricism, the only task is to verify that the trade-off exists in the present data.
The second hypothesis is that mobile borrowers choose low-points/high-rate contracts. While
verfication of this hypothesis supports the model, it can also be viewed as a corroboration of
conventional wisdom independent of the model. The third hypothesis is that the mortgage
market equilibrium involves adverse selection. This hypothesis is, of course, not part of
conventional wisdom, and empirical evidence in favor of it would lend support to the present
framework.
a. Data. Empirical evidence is developed using the Home Financing Transaction
Database compiled by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). This database comes
from a quarterly nationwide survey of a select panel of real estate brokers, and it provides
detailed information about individual mortgage transactions, including features of the mort-
gage contract, characteristics of the borrower, and characteristics of the property. The em-
pirical analysis focuses on transactions for the four years 1988-1991. A number of additional
restrictions are appHed to generate the sample. First, only 30-year fixed-rates mortgages are
included, consistent with the model's focus on fixed-payment contracts. Attention is also
restricted to conventional contracts (FHA and VA mortgages are thus excluded). Contracts
involving a second or third mortgage, seller-paid points, interest-rate buydowns, a mortgage
assumption, or seller financing are also excluded. Finally, observations are excluded if there
are missing values for any of the borrower-characteristics variables used to compute the
mobility proxy (discussed below), as are observations with missing mortgage points. The
resulting sample has 418 observations, fairly evenly distributed across the sample years. The
mean interest rate in the sample is 9.96%, and the distribution of mortgage points is shown
in Table 1 (points are measured in basis points),
b. Rate regressions. The first step in the empirical analysis is to verify that the
data exhibit a trade-off between the mortgage interest rate (denoted RATE) and points
{POINTS). This is done by regressing RATE on POINTS, controlling for temporal
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and regional effects. ^^ Temporal effects are represented by dummy variables indicating the
month and year in which the mortgage transaction occured. Regional dummy variables (rep-
resenting the Northeast, Midwest, and South) capture differences in mortgage rates across
regions of the country. The estimating equations embody several different specifications of
the connection between RATE and POINTS. In the first, POINTS enters linearly in
the equation, implying that the marginal RATE discount from an increase in POINTS
is the same over the entire range of the variables. As seen in the first column of Table
2, the POINTS coefficient under this specification is equal to —0.0758, indicating that a
100 basis-point increase in points yields a 7.6 basis-point reduction in RATE (for example,
RATE might fall from 9.576 percent to 9.500 percent). This effect is statistically significant
(coefficients of the regional and time dummies are not reported). ^^
Another approach is to classify mortgages into high-points and low-points ranges, indi-
cated by a dummy variable. Table 2 shows the effect of two different classifications, which
define a high-points mortgage to be a contract with POINTS greater than or equal to 200
basis points, or alternatively, greater than or equal to 200 basis points.^® Using the first
classification, the high-points dummy variable has a statistically-significant coefficient of
— 12.77, indicating that the RATE discount on contracts with POINTS above 250 is nearly
13 basis points. The dummy coefficient for the second classification is —13.18, showing a
RATE discount of slightly more than 13 basis points.
c. Mobility proxy. To test the hypothesis that mobile borrowers choose low-points
mortgages, a proxy for mobility is needed. Brueckner and FoUain (1988), who used the
same NAR database to investigate the FRM-ARM choice, measured mobility through a
dummy variable NEWCITY indicating whether the borrower is new to the metropolitan
area (intermetropoiitan movers were expected to be more mobile than intrametropolitan
movers). Since the effect of the NEWCITY variable on mortgage points is not statistically
significant, a different proxy is constructed using panel data from the American Housing
Survey.^^
This auxiliary sample consists of a set of 2106 houses that were purchased between
1984 and 1985 using a fixed-rate mortgage and were observed again in 1989. Mobility
patterns for the initial occupants of these houses are explained using a probit equation.
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The dependent variable is set equal to one if the initial occupant had moved by 1989,
and is set equal to zero otherwise. After some experimentation, the following variables,
which are common to both the NAR and American Housing Survey databases, were selected
to explain observed mobility: regional dummies for the Northeast, Midwest, and South
{NEAST, MIDWEST, and SOUTH); a dummy indicating whether the home purchased
in 1985 was a detached single-family dwelling {SINGLEAM)\ a dummy indicating whether
the household was a first-time homebuyer (FRSTHOME)] a dummy indicating whether
the household's residence prior to 1985 was in the same metropolitan area {SAMECITY,
equal to 1 — NEWCITY above); a dummy indicating whether the household contained a
married couple (MARRIED); the age of the household head in 1985 (AGE); the number
of bedrooms in the home (BEDRMS); the home's purchase price (PRICE); the log of
household income (LINC); the number of children in the household (KIDS); and a dummy
variable indicating a central city location in 1985 (CENTCITY).
The probit results are presented in Table 3. The results show lower mobility in the
Northeast and Midwest than in the West (the default region), and relatively low mobility
among older buyers and among buyers of expensive, single-family detached houses. Mobility
is also low among intrametropolitan movers, confirming Brueckner and Follain's expectation
for this variable (the coefficients of all these variables are statistically significant). While
mobility also appears to be lower among married households with children, among first-time
buyers and central-city households, and among high-income households, none of these effects
is statistically significant (house size as measured by BEDRMS also has no effect).
To generate a mobility proxy for use in explaining the POINTS choice, the estimated
coefficients in Table 3 are used to compute the probabihty of moving for each household
in the NAR sample, denoted PROBMOVE (from above, the relevant time horizon is four
years). The sample mean value of PROBMOVE is 0.290, and the minimum and maximum
values are 0.051 and 0.563 respectively.
d. The effect of mobility on POINTS. The most direct way to test the hypoth-
esis that high-mobility borrowers choose low-points mortgages is to regress POINTS on
PROBMOVE. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) results for this regression are reported in
the first column of Table 4. The estimated coefficient of PROBMOVE is negative, as ex-
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pected, and statistically significant. Its magnitude of —168 shows that when a borrower's
probability of moving rises by 0.10, POINTS decreases by 17 ba^is points. Note that the
significant impact of PROBMOVE emerges despite the fact that the R^ for the equation is
quite small (under 2%). The third column of Table 4 shows the effect of adding LINC and
FRSTHOME to the regression, variables that may reflect the household's ability to pay
extra costs at the time of mortgage origination. While these variables aifect POINTS in a
plausible manner (positively for LINC and negatively for FRSTHOME), both coefficients
are insignificant. Moreover, use of these additional variables has little effect on the magni-
tude and significance level of the PROBMOVE coefficient. Observe, however, that the R^
for the regression remains low, suggesting that other, unobserved variables may play a role
in the choice of POINTS.
Given that PROBMOVE is the estimated (instead of true) probability of moving, the
error term in the above regression does not satisfy the assumptions required for application
of OLS. In particular, the error term includes the difference between the estimated and true
move probabilities, a quantity that in turn depends on the estimated probit coefficients from
Table 3. Because these coefficients enter the error term for each observation, all the errors
are correlated, implying that generalized least-squares (GLS) is the appropriate estimation
technique. Application of this technique, which is explained in the appendix, leads to the
results in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.^0 Although the t-statistics for PROBMOVE fall
somewhat, the estimates are generally similar to the OLS results.
e. Testing for adverse selection. By showing that mobile borrowers choose low-
points contracts, the preceding results constitute a test of a key prediction of the model.
However, because this prediction also reflects conventional wisdom, the results can be viewed
as a test of this wisdom, independent of any particular model. To test a prediction that is
more specific to the present framework, the empirical focus shifts to the question of adverse
selection.^^
The test for adverse selection is based on the observation that, when the equilibrium
has this property, one borrower type is indifferent between the available mortgage contracts,
while the other type strictly prefers one contract. In other words, the market trade-off
between io and i\ is the same as the trade-off along an indifference curve for one borrower
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type, while the other borrower's curve exhibits a steeper trade-ofF (refer, for example, to
points J and K in Figure 2). As will be seen, the test based on this observation involves
a number of strong assumptions. As a result, it is best to view the test as illustrating a
methodology rather than establishing a firm conclusion.
The market trade-ofF between zq and i\ (between points and the interest rate) has
already been estimated in the regressions reported in Table 2. The remaining task is to
estimate the borrower's utility function so that the above comparison can be carried out. To
simplify matters, let the function V be approximated by a linear expression with parameter
ft. Ignoring the T and ^ terms (which cancel below), the expected utility expression (1)
then becomes Q.{y — I'o) + ^(1 — prn)^{M — ^i), "^ = ^, '• To estimate ft and 6, the
sample is divided arbitrarily into high-points and low-points contracts, as discussed above,
and a probit procedure is applied, as follows. Denoting the contracts by H and X, and
using the notation of Section 2, initial payments are equal to i^ — t^ -\- p^ and Iq =
t^ -\- p^ , and final payments are equal to i^^ = t^ and i[ = t^, where t and p again
denote interest rate and points. Expected utility of the H contract for a type-m borrower
is ft [y — {t^ -{- p^) -|- ^(1 — Pm){y ~ ^^)] ? m = h^l, and a similar expression holds for the L
contract. The difference in utilities between the H and L contracts is then
-ft [(t"
-f p^) - (t^ + p^)] - nSil - pm){t" -t^l m = h, I (11)
Using (11), ft and S can be estimated by a probit procedure, with the dependent variable
equal to one under the H choice and zero under the L choice. Replacing t and p by the
empirical variables RATE and POINTS, the explanatory variables (denoted X and Y) are,
for observation k,
Xk = RATE" -\- POINTS" -{RATE^ + POINTS^) (12)
Yk = {l-PROBMOVEk){RATE" -RATE^). (13)
The coefficients of these variables are —ft and — ^ft respectively, so that the borrower's
discount factor 8 can be recovered by taking their ratio. Note that the variable X, which is
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constant across observations, plays the role of the intercept variable (normally set equal to
one).
The probit procedure is implemented using alternative specifications based on the two
high-points cut-offs discussed earlier (recall that these are 200 and 250 basis points). The
difference RATE^ —RATE^ is set equal to the appropriate dummy coefficient from Table 2:
-12.77 in the 200 case, and -13.18 in the 250 case. POINTS" - POINTS^ is computed
as the difference in the mean value of POINTS between the high-points and low-points
subsamples. This difference is 136 basis points under the 200 cut-off and 138 basis points
under the 250 cut-off.
Probit estimates axe presented in Table 5, with the two columns showing the results for
the different high-points cut-offs. ^'^ In both cases, the coefficients of X and Y are negative
and statistically significant, as required by the model. The results thus provide additional
confirmation of the hypothesized inverse relationship between points and borrower mobility.
The implied discount factor (the Y coefficient divided by the X coefficient) differs across
equations, mainly because of the difference in X coefficients. The implied estimate of S
is 19.8 for the 200 cut-off and 11.8 for the 250 cut-off. While these values greatly exceed
unity, in apparent contradiction of the model, the explanation lies in the fact that the model
collapses the future into a single period. ^^
To carry out a test for the presence of adverse selection, the two estimates of 6 are
averaged to yield an intermediate value of 15.8. Using this 6 value, the marginal rate of
substitution between ii and z'o, equal to 1/^(1 — p) from (2), is computed for representa-
tive low-mobility and high-mobility borrowers. In particular, the MRS is evaluated for
PROBMOVE values one standard deviation above and below the sample mean of 0.2904.
These PROBMOVE values are 0.2234 and 0.3574, and the resulting MRS's equal 0.081
and 0.098 for the low- and high-mobility borrowers respectively.
These MRS^s can be compared to the trade-off between I'l and io available in the
market. Recalling from Table 2 that a 100-basis-point increase in POINTS reduces the
interest rate by 7.58 basis points, it follows that a 7.58 decrease in t is associated with a
92.42 = 100 — 7.58 increase mt-\-p. This implies that the trade-off between z'l and io occurs
at a rate of 0.082 = 7.58/92.24.
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Comparing this value to the MRS figures from above, it is clear that the low-mobiHty
borrower is almost exactly indifferent among choices from the available points/interest rate
menu (0.081 « 0.082). The MRS of the high-mobility borrower, however, is greater than
the slope of this menu (0.098 > 0.082). The equilibrium outcome thus appears to resemble
that in the lower half of Figure 2, where the type-/ borrower is indifferent between contracts
J and K, while the type-h indifference curve is steeper than the line segment connecting
J and K. The results appear to suggest, therefore, that adverse selection is present in the
market, and that high-mobility borrowers are harmed by it. However, since this conclusion
rests on a number of assumptions, it is best viewed a^ illustrative.'^^
4. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed a simple mobility-based model of mortgage lending with asym-
metric information, and has used the results to illuminate the issue of mortgage points. The
analysis suggests that by offering a points/interest-rate menu, lenders are able to induce
borrower self-selection across mortgage contracts according to unobserved mobility. The
self-selection implied by the model conforms to conventional wisdom, with mobile borrow-
ers choosing low-points/high-rate contracts from the available menu. As in other adverse-
selection models, separation of the borrower types is achieved at a cost: welfare is reduced
relative to the full-information case. The analysis shows that this cost can be borne by either
borrower type (high-mobility or low-mobility) depending on parameter values. Finally, the
analysis shows that a prepayment penalty is not a perfect substitute for mortgage points
in the presence of adverse selection. Introduction of such a penalty either lowers or raises
welfare, depending on the characteristics of the mortgage market equilibrium.
The empirical results show that a points/interest-rate trade-off is present in the data,
and that borrowers select contracts from this menu in the expected fashion according to mo-
bility. In addition, the results suggest evidence of adverse selection, although this conclusion
is not definitive.
This paper may help improve our understanding of the role of borrower mobility and
asymmetric information in the mortgage market. Further research exploring the effects of
both these factors on the structure of mortgage contracts deserves high priority.
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Appendix
a. Analysis of the prepayment penalty. First, it is shown that introduction of
the prepayment penalty has no effect on the welfare of the type-/ borrower. Using the
modified version of (1), the change expected utility is equal to
-(1-pO PmV'{y-i^ -s) 1 + di'o
Kl
(al)
Substituting from (8) and evaluating at 5 = 0, (al) reduces to zero.
To derive the impact of the prepayment penalty on the type-h contract, the following
equations are differentiated:
{1- pi)[V{y-i^) + SV{y-i()]
-f piViy-i^-s) = constant
•J 1 ^0 ~ ^0 - Phsi{ = ri +
(a2)
(a3)
0{l-Ph)
Eq. (a3) is the zero-profit condition (the type-h locus is now relevant), and (a2) is the
adverse-selection condition discussed in the text. Differentiation of (a2) and (a3) yields the
following impacts:
^ = Z[(p,-p,)V'(y-ii)] > 0, (a4)
d
S- = Z[Sp^{l-p,)V'{y-t{) - e(l-p^)p,V'{y-ii)] > (<) 0, (a5)
where
Z = [e{l-p,)V'{y-ii) - 8{l-p,)V'{y-i()] < (a6)
To verify that Z has a negative sign, observe that since the type-h indifference curve is
flatter than the zero profit locus at J, V'(y - i^)/6{l — ph)V'{y — i{) < 1/^(1 - ph) holds
(see (2)), implying SV'{y - i^) < SV'(y - z/). Given (1 - ph) < (1 - Pi), Z is then negative,
and the positive sign of di(lds in (a4) follows by inspection. Manipulation of (a4) and (a5)
establishes d{iQ — i{)/ds < 0.
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To compute the welfare impact on the type-h borrower, an expression analogous to (al)
is evaluated (pi is replaced by ph, and the K subscripts are replaced by J). Substituting the
results from (a4) and (a5), the welfare impact simplifies to
-Z(l - pH)iph - PiW'iy - z^) [eV'iy - ii) - 6V'(y - if)] < 0, (a7)
where the inequality follows from previous results. Thus, introduction of the prepayment
penalty reduces expected utility for the type-h borrower.
Now suppose the tangencies are above Q and the type-/ borrower is the one hurt by
adverse selection. In this case, the contracts are relabeled A and F, as in Figure 2, and the
h and / subscripts change places in the analysis. In addition, since the indifference curve
at F is steeper than the zero-profit locus, the sign of Z changes to positive, and the term
analogous to the one in brackets in (a7) also becomes positive. The welfare effect based on
the analog to (al) is then posiiive instead of negative.
b. The GLS procedure. The GLS procedure is carried out as follows. Let the
true model determining POINTS be POINTSi = rj'Wi -\- (3Pi -\- Ui, where P^ equals
PROBMOVE for observation z, W^ is a vector of other explanatory variables, u, is an
error term with mean zero and variance cr^, and 7/ and (5 are coefficients (77 is a vector).
Replacing Pi with its estimated value Pj, the model can be rewritten
POINTSr =rJ'W^-\- 13P, -\- e., (a8)
where e, = m -\- (3(Pi — Pi). Let 7 denote the vector of estimated probit coefficients from
the mobility equation and Zi denote the vector of explanatory variables in that equation for
observation i (the values of these variables are drawn from the NAR data set, not from the
AHS data set used to generate 7). Then, letting $ denote the standard normal cumulative
distribution function, P,- — P, = ^(^Zi) — ^(j'Zi). Using a Taylor series expansion, the
right-hand side of this equaUty can be approximated by (f)(j' Zi)(YZi — y'Zi)^ where (j) is the
normal density function. Let the matrix A be defined as
A = [(l>(j'Zi)Z,---<f>(YZn)Zn]. (a9)
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Then the variance-covariance matrix of the error vector e is equal to
A = all + IS^A'AA, (alO)
where A is the variance-covariance matrix of 7.
A must be estimated to carry out the GLS procedure. Estimates of the unknown
parameters in 13^ A'AA are available from the probit and OLS results. An estimate of (j„
is derived by first noting that, given the formula for e^, the probability limit of ^€J/n is
equal to a^ plus the probabihty limit of (3"^ Yl^il'^iyil'^i ~ I'^iYI'^ (^ is the sample
size). The latter probability limit is equal to the limit of /9^ Yl (l>{Y^i)^^i^^i/''^ as n ^^ 00.
The plim of ^ ef /n can be estimated by ^ e^/n = a^, where the e, are residuals from the
OLS regression. Therefore, a^ can be estimated by
al = al - 'fY.'^(f,'Z,fZ\kZ,ln. (all)
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Table 1.
The Sample Distribution of Mortgage Points*
POINTS Observations
5 1
25 4
38 1
50 1
75 2
88 1
100 58
125 4
138 2
150 30
163 1
175 8
185 1
187 1
200 131
220 1
225 9
238 1
250 29
265 1
275 4
288 3
300 106
325 2
338 1
350 5
375 2
400 5
450 2
750 1
total 418
*POINTS is measured in basis points
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Table 2.
POINTS Coefficients in RATE Regressions^
POINTS enters equation as: Coefficient
Linear variable —0.0758
(3.17)
Dummy equal to one when POINTS > 200 -12.77
(2.92)
Dummy equal to one when POINTS > 250 -13.18
(3.24)
't-statistics in parenthesis;
observations=812
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Table 3.
Probit Estimates of the Mobility Equation*
Variable Coefficient
CONSTANT 0.8219
(2.45)
NEAST -0.3001
(3.25)
MIDWEST -0.2486
(2.91)
SOUTH -0.0701
(0.89)
SINGLFAM -0.1650
(2.31)
FRSTHOME -0.0709
(1.08)
SAMECITY -0.1645
(2.77)
MARRIED -0.0183
(0.27)
AGE -0.0059
(2.05)
BEDRMS -0.0530
(1.31)
PRICE -0.0015
(2.23)
LINC -0.0227
(0.78)
KIDS -0.0092
(0.34)
CENTCITY -0.0506
(0.79)
'Dependent variable is one if a move occiired and zero otherwise;
asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses;
observations=2 106
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Table 4.
Regressions Relating POINTS to PROBMOVE*
Coefficients
Variable OLS GLS OLS GLS
CONSTANT 265.31
(14.80)
265.84
(13.11)
234.31
(1.66)
201.60
(1.38)
PROBMOVE -167.73
(2.78)
-165.87
(2.57)
-151.67
(2.10)
-142.29
(1.90)
LINC 2.67
(0.23)
5.53
(0.45)
FRSTHOME -15.51
(1.41)
-14.18
(1.25)
i?2 0.018 0.018 0.024 0.024
*t-statistics (or asymptotic t-statistics) in parentheses;
observations=418
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Table 5.
Probit Estimates of the Borrower Utility Function*
Cc(efficients
200 cut-off 250 cut-off
Variable
X -0.012
(2.15)
-0.020
(3.64)
Y -0.234
(3.00)
-0.237
(3.24)
*asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses
observations=418
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Footnotes
*I am indebted to Stuart Rosenthal and Glenn Sueyoshi for their help with the empirical
work in this paper and to Kangoh Lee, Jack Marshall, and Alfredo Pereira for helpful
comments (none of these individuals is responsible for errors). I also wish to thank Forrest
PaiFenberg of the National Association of Realtors for providing the data.
^See also Brueckner and Follain (1989) and Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1990). Brueckner (1992)
shows that with a continuum of borrower types differentiated by mobility, the division of
borrowers between ARMs and fixed-rate loans is endogenous and dependent on market
conditions. For a related analysis, see Rosenthal and Zom (1992).
^Kau and Keenan (1987) develop an alternative model where points emerge as a result of
asymmetric tax treatment of lenders and borrowers.
"^As explained below, lenders in the model are risk neutral while borrowers are risk averse.
Under these circumstances, efficient mortgage contracts require that all interest-rate risk
be borne by the lender (see Arvan and Brueckner (1986)). Adjustable-rate mortgages are
therefore inefficient, and they will not emerge in a mortgage market equilibrium. This
allows the analysis to focus on fixed-payment mortgages.
^Note that saving and non-mortgage borrowing is suppressed in the model. If additional
borrowing to help defray mortgage costs were allowed, then high mortgage payments would
reduce future disposable income because of the need to repay these supplementary loans.
In this ca^e, r,„ and ^m would depend on io and zi.
^Implicitly, housing appreciation is also absent.
^Empirical evidence on refinancing is provided by Green and Shoven (1986), Quigley (1987),
and Quigley and Van Order (1990). Analysis of financially-motivated prepayment also
underlies option-ba^ed models of mortgage pricing, which are developed by Hall (1985),
Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1992), and Follain, Scott and Yang (1992) (see the
survey article by Hendershott and Van Order (1987) for further references).
^This profit expression depends critically on the fact that lending is supported by financial
intermediation (i.e., by funds from depositors). Suppose instead that a loan of one dollar
were made from the lender's own funds, with the principal repaid along with ii. Then,
in the case where pm = 0, the present value of profit from the loan would equal —1-1-
^io + B^{ii + 1) instead of zq - tq + 0{ii — ri), and a similar expression would apply when
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Pm > 0.
®To see the effect of a longer mortgage term, suppose that the term is T + 1 > 2 periods.
In this case, (3) is replaced by
T
to - To + ^[^(1 - Pm)Viij - Tj), m = h,l,
;=i
where ij and rj are the mortgage payment per dollar of loan and the expected cost of
funds in period j. Assuming that ij = I'l and rj = ri, j = 2, • • • , T, so that payments and
the cost of funds are constant beyond period zero, the zero-profit locus based on (3) can
be written
^1 =7-1-1- — rrfyn, m = h,l,
where
1-[^(1 - Pm)V
Similarly, the term (1 — pm)SV{y — ii) in (1) is replaced by S{1 — /9m)-^mV'(y — ii), where
Am = —
-TTz r-, m = h,L
1 -d{l - pm)
Results of the analysis are unaifected.
^This fact can be established as follows. Since
V'{y-t^) 1
S{l-ph)V'{y-i^) S(l-ph)
holds at point A in Figure 1, it follows that
V'{y - 1^) ^ 1
>
S{l-pi)V'{y-z^) S{l-pi)
holds at point N (not shown), which lies on the type-/ locus directly below A (its coor-
dinates axe {io,ii^))- Therefore, the type-/ indifference curve is steeper than the type-/
locus at N, implying that the tangency is located uphill from N. Similarly,
V'iy - ^o^)
^
1
6{l-pi)V'{y-it) S{l-pi)
holds at point P (not shown), which lies on the type-/ locus directly to the left of A (its
coordinates are {io-,i'^))- The type-/ indifference curve is thus flatter than the locus at
point P, implying that the tangency lies downhill from P (note that point P may have
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a negative io coordinate, a possibility that has no effect on the ajgmnent). While this
argument ignores potential corner solutions, the result in the text applies as long as at
lea^st one of the indifference curves is tangent to its respective locus. Finally, analogous
reasoning applies to the case where the tangencies are below the intersection point.
^°To establish this claim, the first step is to observe that individual contracts must break
even, ruling out cross subsidies. To see this, suppose that in equilibrium, each lender
were to offer contracts C and D in Figure 1, assigned to type-/ and type-h borrowers
respectively. C lies below the type-/ locus, and is thus unprofitable, but the loss is made
up by the profit earned on contract D, which lies above the type-h locus. In this situation,
if the alternative contract E, earmarked for type-h borrowers, were offered by some lender,
it would be profitable and would attract h-types away from contract Z), in violation of
requirement (ii) above. Note that the same conclusion would apply in the "pooling" case
where contracts C and D are identical. The upshot is that contracts must break even on an
individual basis, lying on the two zero-profit loci. Moreover, unless each contract coincides
with the tangency point on its respective locus, there will exist preferred contracts that
are profitable, in violation of (ii).
^^Note that the type-h indifference curve through point A could intersect the type-/ locus
twice, once at a point like F and again at an uphill point R. It is easy to see, however,
that point R and all uphill points are dispreferred to F by the type-/ borrower (observe
that the type-/ indifference curve through R must be flatter than the type-h curve, which
implies that it lies above the latter curve to the right of R and thus passes above F).
^•^This statement requires an additional qualification. If type-/ borrowers make up a very
high proportion of the population, then a contract such as S in Figure 2 would earn a
profit if both borrower types chose it. Since both types do indeed prefer 5 over their
respective contracts, F and A, a lender could offer 5, attract both borrower types, and
earn a profit, indicating that F and A are not equilibrium contracts. Since contract S is
itself not an equilibrium for reasons discussed above, the conclusion is that equilibrium
does not exist. To rule out this possibility, the type-/ proportion of the population must
be low enough so that all break-even pooling contracts lie above the type-/ indifference
curve through F. A similar qualification apphes to the alternate case discussed next.
13
I am grateful to Jack Marshall for these observations.
^^In the alternate case where Q lies above the 45 degree line, a diagram analogous to Figure
3 shows that in equilibrium, the low-mobility borrower selects his full-information contract
(the corner solution on the 45 degree line), while the high-mobility borrower selects the
contract located at the intersection of his zero-profit locus and the low-mobility borrower's
indifference curve. The resulting equilibrium has the low-mobility borrower choosing a
zero-points mortgage, and the high-mobility borrower choosing a positive-points contract.
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15Dunn and Spatt (1985) offer a related analysis of prepayment penalties.
^^A larger sample, which includes observations with missing values for some borrower-
characteristics variables, is used for the rate regressions. This sample has 812 observations.
^'^The possibility that the RATE discount varies with time and region, which would call
for interactions between POINTS and the dummies, is ruled out (results under such a
specification are unsatisfactory).
^®In the 812-observation sample used for the rate regressions, 72% of the observations are
high-points contracts under the 200 cut-off, while 38% axe high-points contracts under the
250 cut-off.
^^I am indebted to Stuart Rosenthal for suggesting this approach and for giving me access
to his AHS data.
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I am indebted to Glenn Sueyoshi for help in deriving the GLS procedure.
^^For an attempt to test for adverse selection in insurance markets, see Puelz and Snow
(1992).
^^While both explanatory variables in the probit equation are estimated variables, no at-
tempt is made to correct the standard errors of the coefficients.
^^From footnote 6, the discount factor applied to utility from future periods is
Am = d{l - pm)— 77:; T-, m = h,l,
1 - (5(1 - pm)
which does not simplify into a simple function of 6 and pm- The empirical model is derived
by approximating this expression by ^(1 — Pm)-, where S can be thought of as the discount
factor for the entire future, which can be greater than unity.
^'^The probit results could be used directly to test for the presence of adverse selection, as
follows. First, using the estimates, utility levels for the low-points and high-points con-
tracts would be compared for the average low-points borrower (this is done by evaluating
(11) with Pm set equal to the average value of PROBMOVE for low-points borrowers).
Similarly, the utility levels of the two contracts would be compared for the average high-
points borrower. If the results of these calculations showed that one borrower is roughly
indifferent between the contracts while the other borrower strictly prefers his own con-
tract, that would constitute evidence of adverse selection (this procedure is equivalent to
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comparing each borrower's MRS to the ii/io trade-ofF between the H and L contracts,
as in the text).
Unfortunately, the results of these calculations are not informative. While the average
high-points borrower prefers his own contract in the case of the 200 cut-off, this contract
is also preferred by the average low-points borrower. For the 250 cut-off, exactly the reverse
is true: the low-points borrower prefers his own contract, but it is also preferred by the
high-points borrower. It is important to realize that nothing in the probit estimation
procedure prevents this type of anomaly in utility comparisons. While the calculations in
the text rely on the probit estimates of ^, the procedure differs by using the ii/io trade-ofF
from the hneax regression, and by using PROBMOVE values separated by two standard
deviations to evaluate ph and pi (the average PROBMOVE values in the high-points and
low-points subsamples are much closer, differing by less than 0.025).
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